[Editor's Note: Jonathan Larson, the creator of "Rent," the Tony Award and Pulitzer Prize winning rock opera, will never write another song because of two New York hospitals╒ malpractice, according to this March 11, 1996 complaint filed by Larson╒s estate. Larson died Jan. 25, a few hours after the final dress rehearsal for his play. Larson went to Cabrini Medical Center a few days before, complaining of stomach pain. Doctors took x-rays, told him it was something he had eaten, and pumped his stomach. Two days later, Larson went to St. Vincent╒s Hospital with the same complaint. Doctors took more x-rays and said he had a virus. He later died of a ruptured aortic aneurysm. His estate claims the aneurysm should have been detected in the x-rays.]
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
ALLAN S. LARSON and JULIE LARSON
McCOLLUM, as Co-Administrators of
the Goods, Chattels and Credits
which were of JONATHAN DAVID
LARSON, Deceased,
Plaintiff,
- against -
CABRINI MEDICAL CENTER and ST.
VINCENT'S HOSPITAL OF NEW YORK,
Defendants.
VERIFIED COMPLAINT
Index No. 104440/96
3/11/96
Plaintiff, complaining of the defendants, by his attorney, DAVID L. TABACK, P.C., respectfully alleges, upon information and belief, at all times hereinafter mentioned, as follows:
THE PARTIES
1. Plaintiff's decedent was a resident of the City, County and State of New York.
2. On or about the 25th day of January, 1996, plaintiff's decedent JONATHAN DAVID LARSON died.
3. Letters of Administration were issued to ALLAN S. LARSON and JULIE LARSON McCOLLUM, as Co-Administrators of the Goods, Chattels and Credits which were of JONATHAN DAVID LARSON, on or about the 4th day of March, 1996, by Order of the Honorable Renee R. Roth, Surrogate of the County of New York, State of New York.
4. Defendant CABRINI MEDICAL CENTER is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of New York.
5. Defendant CABRINI MEDICAL CENTER owns a hospital premises located at 227 East 19th Street, New York, New York.
6. Defendant CABRINI MEDICAL CENTER, its agents, servants and/or employees, operated, maintained, managed, controlled and supervised the aforesaid hospital, which held itself out to the public at large and, more particularly, to the plaintiff's decedent herein as a hospital duly qualified and capable of rendering adequate medical care and treatment to the public and for such purposes hired physicians, radiologists, nurses, attendants and other personnel.
7. Defendant ST. VINCENT'S HOSPITAL OF NEW YORK is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of New York.
8. Defendant ST. VINCENT'S HOSPITAL OF NEW YORK owns a hospital premises located at 153 West 11th Street, New York, New York.
9. Defendant ST. VINCENT'S HOSPITAL OF NEW YORK, its agents, servants and/or employees, operated, maintained, managed, controlled and supervised the aforesaid hospital, which held itself, out to the public at large and, more particularly, to the plaintiff's decedent herein as a hospital duly qualified and capable of rendering adequate medical care and treatment to the public and for such purposes hired physicians, radiologists, nurses, attendants and other personnel.
THE UNDERLYING FACTS
10. On or about the 21st day of January, 1996, plaintiff's decedent JONATHAN DAVID LARSON was admitted to the Emergency Room of defendant CABRINI MEDICAL CENTER.
11. During the course of said admission, plaintiff's decedent came under the care of and was treated by the agents, servants and/or employees of defendant CABRINI MEDICAL CENTER.
12. It was the duty of defendant CABRINI MEDICAL CENTER, its agents, servants and/or employees, to care for and treat plaintiff's decedent in accordance with good and accepted medical standards.
13. On or about the 23rd day of January, 1996, plaintiff's decedent JONATHAN DAVID LARSON was admitted to the Emergency Room of defendant ST. VINCENT'S HOSPITAL OF NEW YORK.
14. During the course of said admission, plaintiff's, decedent came under the care of and was treated by the agents, servants and/or employees of defendant ST. VINCENT'S HOSPITAL OF NEW YORK
15. It was the duty of defendant ST. VINCENT'S HOSPITAL OF NEW YORK, its agents, servants and/or employees, to care for and treat plaintiff's decedent in accordance with good and accepted medical standards.
AS AND FOR A FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
16. The medical care and treatment rendered by the defendants to plaintiff's decedent was rendered in a reckless, careless and negligent manner, not in accordance and conformity with proper medical practice and procedure.
17. Among other things, defendants, their agents, servants and/or employees, were reckless, careless and negligent in failing to timely and properly diagnose and treat plaintiff's decedent's true medical condition; in failing to perform a proper physical examination; in railing to take a proper history; in failing to perform proper tests and studies; in failing to properly read and/or interpret the results of those tests which were taken; in failing to have qualified and duly licensed physicians and specialists read and/or interpret the results of those tests taken; in railing to have adequate, qualified and competent personnel; in failing to admit the plaintiff's decedent into the hospital; in abandoning the plaintiff's decedent; and defendants were otherwise reckless, careless and negligent.
18. As a result of the recklessness, carelessness and negligence of the defendants, plaintiff's decedent was caused to suffer severe pain and suffering as well as emotional distress, mental anguish, anxiety and fear of dying prior to his death on January 25, 1996.
19. By reason of the foregoing, defendants are jointly and severally liable pursuant to the exceptions set forth in Article 16 of the CPLR.
20. By reason of the foregoing, plaintiff's decedent's estate is entitled to recover all of his damages from defendants pursuant to CPLR 3017 (c), the amount of which exceeds the jurisdictional limits of all lower Courts.
AS AND FOR A SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
21. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and realleges each and every allegation contained in the paragraphs of this Complaint numbered "1" through "19", inclusive, with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth at length herein.
22. As a result of the recklessness, carelessness and negligence of the defendants, as aforesaid, plaintiff's decedent died on January 25, 1996.
23. As a result of the foregoing, ALLAN S. LARSON and JULIE LARSON McCOLLUM, and the heirs, distributees and next-of-kin whom they represent were caused to sustain pecuniary loss, loss of society, services and companionship and were caused to incur medical and funeral expenses.
24. By reason of the foregoing, plaintiff's decedent's estate is entitled to recover all damages from defendants pursuant to CPLR 3017(c), the amount of which exceeds the jurisdictional limits of all lower Courts.
AS AND FOR A THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
25. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and realleges each and every allegation contained in the paragraphs of this Complaint numbered "1" through "19" and "22" through "23", inclusive, with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth at length herein.
25. Defendants failed to obtain plaintiff's decedent's consent to the treatment, or lack of treatment, rendered to plaintiff's decedent.
27. Proper medical practice and procedure required defendants to obtain plaintiff's decedent's consent to the treatment, or lack of treatment, rendered to plaintiff's decedent.
28. A reasonably prudent person in plaintiff's decedent's position would not have undergone the treatment, or lack of treatment, provided by defendants had he been properly informed of the risks and hazards of such treatment, or lack of treatment.
29. Plaintiff's decedent would not have agreed to the treatment, or lack of treatment, provided by defendants to plaintiff's decedent had he been properly informed of the risks and hazards of such treatment, or lack of treatment.
30. Defendants' failure to obtain plaintiff's decedent's informed consent is a contributing cause of the injuries sustained by plaintiff's decedent and his estate.
31. By reason or the foregoing, plaintiff's decedent's estate is entitled to recover all damages from defendants pursuant to CPLR 3017(c), the amount of which exceeds the jurisdictional limits of all lower Courts:
WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment against the defendants on the First, Second and Third Causes of Action pursuant to CPLR 3017(c), and demand that he be awarded all damages and relief to which plaintiff's decedent's estate is entitled, together with interest, costs, disbursements and attorney's fees.
Yours, etc.
DAVID L. TABACK, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiff
419 Park Avenue So. - 2nd Floor
New York, New York 10016
(212) 679-5400
ATTORNEY'S VERIFICATION
DAVID L. TABACK, an attorney admitted to practice in the Courts of the State of New York, shows that deponent is the attorney for the plaintiff herein; that deponent has read the foregoing COMPLAINT and know the contents thereof; that the same is true to deponent's own knowledge, except as to the matters therein stated to be alleged upon information and belief, and that as to those matters, deponent believes it to be true.
This verification is made by deponent and not by the plaintiff because the plaintiff resides outside the county where deponent has his offices.
The grounds of deponent's belief as to all matters not stated upon deponent's knowledge are deponent's investigation and information contained in the file.
The undersigned affirms that the foregoing statements are true under the penalties of perjury.
Dated: New York, New York
March 6, 1996
DAVID L. TABACK
ATTORNEY'S CERTIFICATION
DAVID L. TABACK, an attorney duly admitted to practice before the Courts of this State, certifies the following:
1. I am the attorney for the plaintiff.
2. I have reviewed the facts of this case and have consulted with a physician duly licensed to practice medicine in the State of New York and reasonably believe that said physician is knowledgeable with respect to the relevant issues involved in this action
3. Based upon the discussions had with the aforesaid physician, I have concluded on the basis of my review and consultation, that there is a reasonable basis for the commencement or this action.